ABSTRACT. This article examines the role of social media in contemporary political communication, focusing on Barack Obama's Facebook campaign in the run-up to the 2012 presidential election. Although there is a growing body of literature on online forms of participation, little research exists on the role of social buttons on Facebook (like, comment, and share) as tools of political voice. We use these native interactive features as indicators of how citizens engage with particular political messages. A content analysis of posts published on Obama's official Facebook page over the two months leading up to Election Day was conducted, along with a detailed measurement of all user interactions for each post. Our analysis indicates that the Obama campaign used Facebook as a tool of top-down promotion, focusing on Obama's personality and as a means of strategically guiding followers to act, rather than as a means of bottom-up empowerment or hybridized coproduction. However, we also found that followers engaged selectively with campaign messages and often interacted more with policy-oriented posts than with promotional ones. 
Despite the proliferation of studies on online political communication, there is little empiri-80 cal work on engagement through social media (Carlisle & Patton, 2013) . Existing studies focus either on the strategy of particular campaigns or on the effects of Internet/social media use on social capital and political participation 85 in general. Many of these studies are skeptical about the existence of any particularly positive or paradigm-shifting effects, although Vaccari (2010) argues that we may be witnessing the emergence of a hybridized model 90 of top-down strategic control and bottom-up civic empowerment during political campaigns. This study brings together these two conceptual strands to examine the content of Obama's 2012 Facebook campaign and compare it to 95 users' engagement with particular types of messages. There are now several published studies on Obama's 2008 campaign, whose findings and questions regarding innovation, interactivity (or lack of), empowerment (or lack), and differ-100 ent forms of strategic control (e.g., BaldwinPhilippi, 2012) can be used as a benchmark against which to evaluate the 2012 campaign. 105 
THE DIGITIZATION OF "THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN" AND THE

OBAMA PHENOMENON
The gradual professionalization of political communication over the last several decades (Negrine & Lilleker, 2002) was a precursor to a rapid and radical shift to a much more intense, 110 strategic, and personalized level of campaigning via new media that has taken place in the last decade. The digitization of the "permanent campaign" has allowed political parties to reach out to both loyal and swing voters through-115 out the electoral cycle, renewing early hopes regarding the potential of the Web to facilitate dialogic communication-and thus a more substantive relationship-between elected representatives and citizens (Kent & Taylor, 1998) . 120 Campaign Web sites were originally used to provide information and mobilize constituents. Howard Dean was the first to give the Internet a prominent role in his campaign in the runup to the 2004 presidential election (Compton, 125 Gerodimos and Justinussen 3 2008), but critics have posited that his blog was merely a facade of interactivity because he made interactive tools available, but ignored comments from supporters on his blog (Sweetser & Lariscy, 2008) . Online campaigning was still 130 at an early stage, with Web sites being treated as "static campaign flyers" (Endres & Warnick, 2004, p. 323) and used merely for disseminating information rather than building dialogue.
The extent to which the use of social media, (Hampton, Goulet, Rainie, & Purcell, 2011) , with Twitter users increasing from 3 million to 500 mil-155 lion (Semiocast, 2012) , and Facebook exceeding 1 billion users in 2012 (Facebook, 2013) . Much research has been carried out on the unprecedented use of social media in the 2008 U.S. election, making Obama's cam-160 paign a seminal case study of social media use in politics (Cogburn & Espinoza-Vasquez, 2011; Sweetser & Lariscy, 2008; Vaccari 2010; Woolley, Limperos, & Oliver, 2010) . At some point, the 2008 Obama campaign employed up 165 to 100 staff members to work on his social media presence (Hong & Nadler, 2012) . In the 2012 election, the prevalence of social media increased even further (see Table 1 ). Donating was made significantly easier when the Quick 170 Donate function was implemented, wherein a donor's payment information could be stored so that next time they were prompted to donate through an e-mail, text message, or on social media, they could do so with a single click. The 175 Obama campaign utilized Twitter's Q&A sessions feature (http://askobama.twitter.com) and created an "Ask Me Anything" thread on Reddit (Reddit, 2012) .
Although the literature on the use of social 180 media during the 2012 election campaign is only now emerging, several questions and concerns are being posed that are consistent with points raised by previous studies in the United States and Europe. Based on a series of in-depth 185 interviews with 2012 campaign consultants and strategists, Serazio's (2014) study shows "how campaign operatives labor to manage political discourse and news agenda(s) in ways antithetical to [the ideals of the Habermasian public 190 sphere], given the opportunities and challenges that new media technologies afford" (p. 759); in an effort to attract swing voters who tend to tune out partisan messages, the president of a political advertising agency interviewed by Serazio 195 admits that "you have to figure out a way of really disassociating yourself from politics to try to get their attention in the first place" (p. 751). Shifting away from political debates appears to help not only attract people's attention but 200 also control the message. Following a comparison of Barack Obama's and Mitt Romney's Facebook output in the run-up to the 2012 election, Bronstein (2013) concludes that "the main advantage of fandom politics over traditional 205 politics is that it discourages dissent and encourages affective allegiances, i.e., it is easier for the candidate to maintain the support of their audience if they like him or her" (p. 185).
Other recent studies on Obama's use of dig-210 ital media in 2008 and during his presidency produced mixed results regarding the paradigmshifting nature of his communications output.
JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS
In a review of election campaigning across four liberal democracies, Lilleker and Jackson (2011) found that in all cases (including Obama's original campaign), candidates' Web sites "were geared towards furthering the campaign and not enhancing public engagement with the democratic process" (p. 190), although they also note 220 that the only example of bottom-up communication was observed on Barack Obama's blog. Similarly, Katz, Barris, and Jain (2013) found that despite "the impression of responsiveness" (p. 108), the White House has only created dia-225 logical opportunities that do not require more than a nominal reaction.
However, we still need to establish the precise rhetorical tools utilized by the Obama campaign to better understand the extent to which that 230 discourse was close-ended and strategic or inviting of further engagement. Kienpointner (2013) argues that Obama has successfully managed to incorporate rational argumentation into his political rhetoric and, by strategically "maneu- 235 vering," to overcome the polarization of partisan discourse, that is, combining the normative ideal of rational deliberation with efficient persuasion. We thus apply the classic Aristotelian model of rhetorical strategy (logos, ethos, pathos) , which 240 has proven to still be a valuable tool for the understanding of political action in contemporary settings (Martin, 2013) .
Past political campaigns have used a variety of rhetorical tools such as informing, 245 building relationships with the voter, personal appeal (directly addressing the audience or using the imperative mood), building a candidate's image, calls to action, denigrating an opponent, and defending against an opponent's attacks 250 (Sweetser & Lariscy, 2008; Trammell, Williams, Postelnicu, & Landreville, 2006) . It has also been shown that emotional appeals can be particularly impactful on how citizens respond to political messages (Brader, 2005) . It is well 255 known that in 2008, Obama put strong emphasis on hope and looking forward. Indeed, many studies have looked at the rhetoric and language of political candidates, but research is only just beginning to look into the nature of interac-260 tive features on social media (e.g., Bronstein, 2013; Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013; John, 2013) , and there are no known studies examining these in comparison to the rhetoric and content used in Facebook posts, including photographs.
265
EMERGING PATTERNS OF ONLINE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT
The question of whether digital campaigns utilize the medium's capacity for democratic dialogue and even coproduction of policy 270 (Jackson & Lilleker, 2009 ), or whether they stick to one-way communication with few participatory features, is part of a broader debate between proponents of the theory of innovation-the view that social media provide 275 us with space for positive, fact-checked, and decentralized debate, effectively signaling a new paradigm of civic engagement, and those who support the theory of normalization-the view that online campaigns and civic attitudes merely 280 replicate offline traits and phenomena, such as strategic control, candidate focus, and negative campaigning (Larsson, 2013) . The role and attitudes of citizens-and how their civic activities can be facilitated or hampered by the medium's 285 own filters-are also crucial factors.
It has been argued that social media empower voters, and in particular give young people a tool to express their civic voices. A study by Wells and Dudash (2007) showed that two of the 290 most popular sources for political information among young voters are talking to others and the Internet. In fact, 27% of 18-to 29-year-olds even say that SNSs make more of an impact than in-person advocacy in political campaigning 295 (Harvard University Institute of Politics, 2011) . The same survey also shows that young voters looked first to national newspapers for political news on the 2012 election campaign, then to what friends shared on Facebook, followed by 300 official Facebook campaign pages. Other studies expand this to all ages, revealing that voters' political attitudes and behavior are influenced by everyday conversations with family members or complete strangers (Himelboim, Lariscy, 305 Tinkham, & Sweetser, 2012; Lilleker, 2006) . Some have expressed concerns about the fact that the Internet seems to favor homophily and selective exposure, bringing like-minded people together and functioning only to reinforce their 310
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preexisting beliefs, a phenomenon accentuated by sophisticated algorithms that are particularly instrumental across social media, creating a "filter bubble" that restricts the range of perspectives encountered by citizens online (Pariser, 315 2011).
Interestingly, recent studies (e.g., Vaccari, 2013) show that online political campaigns have also become more efficient at improving reception and acceptance of political messages. This 320 is effectively done when individuals see information diffused through low-threshold activities by supporters, for example, seeing content shared by peers. Also, reinforcement seems less relevant when considering undecided vot-325 ers, because they are yet to be persuaded. They seek emotional and economic stimuli and cues from the campaign (Lilleker, 2006 The conversation on Facebook is partly facilitated by posting content, and partly by engaging 365 with existing content through the use of social buttons. These facilitate cross-syndication and quick dissemination of Web content (Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013) . The like button was originally introduced to "replace short affective statements 370 like 'Awesome' and 'Congrats!'" (Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013, p. 5) . Little research exists on the motivation behind why people like on Facebook, but the intuitive assumption is that the number of likes implies exposure, atten-375 tion, and some sort of affirmation, ratification, or endorsement of what is posted. Essentially, a post with many interactions has evidently grabbed more attention and spread more widely, whereas a post with fewer interactions has not 380 been deemed worthy or interesting to engage with. Sharing on social media is an active practice of communication and distribution. It is not sharing in the traditional sense where you give something, so that you consequently have less. 385 It is a nonsacrificial act of participation, benefiting from the positive connotations of the traditional concept of sharing (John, 2013) . Hence, it is a less costly and lower-level form of participation, but still signifies dissemination, exposure, 390 and citizen dialogue.
Having noted that, SNSs are merely a platform facilitating communication to and between voters. Pearson and O'Connell (2012) argue that it is not the number of followers that determines 395 one's influence on Twitter; it is how one uses those 140 letters. Metzgar and Maruggi (2009) contend that social media is just a tool and cannot replace "message, motivation, or strategy" (p. 141). Similarly, Vaccari (2010) reiterates the 400 role of contextual factors, arguing that technology is merely the driver of preexisting motivations. Hence, the medium-specific aspects of a particular campaign-such as Facebook's native features-ought to be examined in conjunction 405 with fundamental social, cultural, political, and psychological aspects of political communication and engagement.
It could be argued that the emergence of civic consumerism-which this type of user-oriented 410 selective online engagement is part of-poses challenges for democratic engagement and traditional notions of civic duty, because citizens and especially young people demand to see the relevance of issues to their own every-415 day lives (Gerodimos, 2008 (Gerodimos, , 2012 (Kirkpatrick, 2010, p. 296 ) raises further questions about the role of empathy and values in contemporary civic engagement through social media.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DESIGN
425
This study seeks to examine how people respond to specific political messages online using social buttons as metrics of civic engagement. Based on this context, our two starting assumptions are that (a) Facebook interactions In from September 1 to November 6, 2012. Three of these posts were photo albums and were not included in the final coding (N = 163) as they were classified as folders (groups of many pictures). Every post was recorded onto a spread-470 sheet, with text, picture, video, and hyperlink as appropriate, and, along with these, the number of interactions (see Figure 1 ). The coding process involved looking at the impact of content (themes and rhetoric), structure (graphics, text 475 length), and strategy (frequency of posts, temporal context, which day of the week posts were published) on the number of likes, comments, and shares that each post received. A higher number of interactions was assumed to indi-480 cate a higher level of engagement with the post content by Facebook users. The codes used were a mixture of select codes from past literature along with codes deduced from the content and rhetoric of 485 the posts. For example, Benoit's functional approach, which examines the division between acclaims, attacks, and defense strategies (Benoit & Benoit, 2005) was employed to compare sentiment with past campaign communication 490 strategies. Additionally, the coding scheme featured six categories deduced from the samples: post structure, Aristotelian rhetoric, rhetorical devices, policy themes, picture content, and call to action. These were further divided into 46 dif-495 ferent codes, which were interpreted in dichotomous categories, sorted by present (1) or absent (0) for each post (Trammell et al., 2006) . (For intercoder reliability see Table 2 .) The data was reviewed twice to refine the discovered codes 500 
FINDINGS
Our analysis indicates that, overall, the Obama campaign treated Facebook as a tool of top-down promotion, as opposed to a means 535 of substantive civic interaction. Furthermore, while messages were highly personalized, both in terms of focusing on Obama's personality and directly addressing the user, they focused more on the symbolic and affective aspects of political 540 communication than on political argumentation and issue-oriented campaigning. However, interestingly, campaign followers were quite selective about which messages they engaged with, often rejecting certain types of posts (if we 545 accept the study's premise that not interacting with a post can be considered an indication of rejection or selective engagement on the part of Facebook users). Before presenting the substantive findings in more detail, we first outline 550 the frequency, volume, and intensity of campaign messages and user interactions across the two-month period.
Campaign and User Interaction Overview
Although the number of page likes (i.e., the 555 total number of users who effectively subscribed to Barack Obama's Facebook page) increased from 28 million in early September of 2008 to 31.8 million in early November (see Figure 2) meaning that an increased number of users were 560 exposed to the president's messages in their Facebook News Feed-the number of post interactions remained mainly steady with a slowly increasing trend line and large fluctuations. Consistency in the social media communica-565 tion strategy was apparent in that two to three posts were published on most days, with an average length of 19.8 words each (see Figure 3) . Limiting Facebook communications to such a small core of posts per day maintains a stable 570 amount of output in order to avoid the contrast between busy and slow news days (or between periods of aggressive or positive and cautious or defensive campaigning); additionally, it ensures that followers' attention is not diluted, given 575 especially the mechanics of Facebook's personalization algorithm, which prioritizes and manipulates the visibility of posts on a user's News Feed (Pariser, 2011) .
The stable and relatively small number of 580 posts comes into stark contrast with the highly volatile and energetic user interaction with those posts (see Figure 4) Figure 4 shows that 600 people interact differently with different posts. For example, some posts peak in comments but not in likes and shares. Although a like is the easiest way to engage (it only requires a click), and therefore receives 605 significantly more interactions than comments or shares, the variation across dates and events suggests that the three interactive features are different not only in terms of effort. As demonstrated below, they also signify different mean-610 ings and constitute different ways of engaging with a given message. This may be more applicable to younger voters in particular, who are more likely to perceive online interactions as a viable form of political participation: a like 615 is arguably a way of affirming or ratifying that which is said; a comment allows for voicing one's opinion, and a share is about sharing information with one's own connections. The changed perception of political participation is 620 also evident in that, according to some studies, young social media users are not as interested in more costly activities such as fund-raising, but rather in debating and establishing relationships with the candidate and fellow supporters, which 625 can be confined to mere interactions on a social media platform (Sweetser & Lariscy, 2008) . 
Campaign Content and Strategy: Facebook as a Tool of Top-Down
630
Personalized Promotion
The overwhelming majority of the messages posted by the campaign in the 67 days before the 2012 election were picture posts, that is, they featured a single photo, usually along 635 with an accompanying caption, text, or commentary (see Table 3 ). This aligns well with Facebook's ethos about sharing visual content, because the platform recently announced a design change to make picture content more 640 prominent (Forbes, 2013) . More than half of the Moving on to the content of the text accompanying the images, we found that Obama's 2012 Facebook campaign was mostly positive and avoided highly polarizing or negative attacks. Using Benoit's functional approach in the coding process allowed us to draw comparisons to previous studies using the same theoretical framework (Benoit & Benoit, 2005; Compton, 2008; Sweetser & Lariscy, 2008; Trammell et al., 2006) . No defensive responses 665 were made to Romney's attacks (although the "Obama Truth Team" Facebook page was more concerned with deflecting attacks and countermaneuvers), which is somewhat different from previous campaigns, although, even in the past, 670 defensive responses were only used on a small scale (Compton, 2008) .
Nearly half of the posts (N = 163) on the official Obama Facebook page were acclaims followed by a considerably smaller number of 675 opponent attacks (Table 4 ). Compared to the 2008 social media campaign, where the divide between character-and policy-focused acclaims was about 55%/45%, respectively (Compton, 2008) , stronger emphasis was placed on charac-680 ter acclaims in the 2012 election and less on policy (62%/38%). Furthermore, while 78.8% of policy statements in the 2004 Bush versus Kerry campaign were attacks against the opponent, only 52% were attacks against character and 685 policy in this campaign. Sixty-four percent of policy statements included acclaims of Obama's own character and policies, suggesting a more positive tone. This is consistent with previous studies of both the 2008 (Lilleker & Jackson, 690 2011) and the 2012 (Bronstein, 2013) campaigns, which found that the Obama team opted for a broadcast message of hope and enthusiasm, while only using negative campaigning through "under the radar" microtargeting 695 (Serazio, 2014, p. 745) .
In terms of the rhetorical tools employed, the case for Obama is mostly built on emotions (pathos) and credibility (ethos) and less so on rational arguments (logos). In fact three-quarters 700 of character acclaims use emotionally charged phrases such as "Obama has revealed himself to be a man who cares about all Americans," ". . . a president who stands up for all Americans . . . ," and "President Obama's leadership has made 705 America stronger, safer, and more secure . . ." A key vehicle for the framing of Obama's credibility was quotes: nearly one-third of all posts used quotes to make a point and the great majority of them contained some form of emotive lan-710 guage and credibility appeal. Only one-quarter of posts contained policy statements, which is very similar to the proportion of policy messages featuring in blogs during the 2004 campaign (Trammell et al., 2006) . 715 Given the highly personalized nature of the American political system, it is not unusual for a presidential campaign to focus on the person of the individual candidate as opposed to more political, institutional, or processual 720 aspects of the campaign. Even so, our analysis shows that Obama's reelection campaign on Facebook focused predominantly on his personality and family, rather than on his policies, ideas, track record, or opponent, which is some-725 what surprising for a sitting president whose first term featured historic executive, legislative, and judicial debates and decisions.
Crucially, policy posts were not framed as opportunities for substantive debate or engage-730 ment, that is, "conversation starters"; they were used as hooks for a call to action, such as sharing (50%), showing support (7%), voting (7%), and finding out more (2.4%). This finding reflects more broadly the entire discourse of the cam-735 paign, which was close-ended, promotional, and highly guarded or controlled. For example, out of 163 posts, only nine contained any type of question, perhaps a somewhat crude but still important indicator of whether the discourse 740 figuratively or literally attempts to engage the audience in a substantive discussion. Even more tellingly, out of those nine questions only one could be characterized as potentially substantive, but even that was tied to a call for action 745 ("Why are you voting for President Obama? Leave your No. 1 reason in the comments and tag a friend to let them know"). All other questions were fully procedural or promotional ("Got a phone? Got Internet? GET HIS BACK. 750 Call.barackobama.com"; "Voting by mail? Put a stamp on that ballot and send it in today"; "Would you describe yourself as a 'talker'? Hit the phones for the president if you've got Barack's back").
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Calls for action and personal appeal (i.e., the use of imperative mood in the sentence structure toward the reader, prompting some sort of action in response to the post) were the two most-used rhetorical devices (see Table 5 ). Interestingly, on the fact that the Obama campaign has strategically and consistently utilized social media to mobilize public support and facilitate a sense of belonging (Katz et al., 2013; Lilleker & Jackson, 2011) . 775 The prominence of mobilization is evident in the campaign's Facebook strategy, with 69.3% of posts prompting engagement in a wide range of subcategories recognized (see Table 6 ). Seven types of call to action were recognized, with 780 "prompting to share" being mostly used. The implied message in most posts was to use the native share function on Facebook to spread the message and make Obama's campaign more (Trammell et al., 2006) , illustrating a more intensive usage of social media to mobilize grass roots and disseminate information 795 (Sweetser & Lariscy, 2008) , but also a strategy that is much more professional and segmented in order to match the particular traits and user trends of each platform. Finally, the language employed across posts 800 largely constitutes a very personal and direct communication approach. As indicated earlier, much focus is placed on President Obama himself, as well as employing personal appeals that attempt to close the discursive and politi-805 cal gap between the reader and the candidate. Words such as you, your, you've, you're, and yours occur 136 times throughout the 163 posts. Additionally, the words we, we've, us, and our occur 67 times, and the word friend or 810 friends occurred 19 times in the context of phrases such as "let your friends know" or "your friends should see this." Facebook's core purpose of connecting people was appropriated by the Obama campaign as it sought to emulate the 815 interpersonal connectivity that is native to the platform. In contrast, the other post received only 22,469 likes, 5,212 comments, and 664 shares:
Last call: Enter before midnight for 865 your chance to join Beyoncé, Jay-Z, and President Obama for an evening in New York. We'll fly you in with a guest: http://OFA. BO/eW6Anj-September, 14, 2012 870 This contrast in user responses to the two types of messages (value-oriented emotive message versus promotional) is precisely typical of how followers reacted to the campaign on Facebook. It also reiterates the power of language, even 875 when there is no visual aid.
Furthermore, during the 67-day period, the campaign posted seven videos on the official Facebook page. Our analysis shows that these videos failed to engage users: posts featuring a 880 video had a statistically significant negative correlation with the number of likes (β = −.358, p < .001), comments (β = −.276, p = .003), and shares (β = −.235, p = .012). In fact, video posts received much less interactions even than 885 text-only posts (see Table 7 ). The reason for this may be the extra time and effort required has long acknowledged the salience of the three elements of Aristotelian rhetoric (logos, pathos, and ethos) and the impact of political messages that are "reasonable, passionate, and reflective of the character of the speaker" 910 (Triadafilopoulos, 1999, p. 741) , respectively. Our analysis shows that posts making use of one or more of those elements were much more engaging (see Figure 5 ). Emotive language in particular dominates much of the campaign on 915 Facebook, being employed in more than half of the posts (see Table 8 ) and emerged as one of the three most impactful variables (the other two being photos of Obama and prompts to share). The use of pathos seems to have struck a chord 920 with campaign followers because emotional 930 found that this type of discourse did have a significant impact on how much people liked (β = .273, η ρ 2 = .080, p < .001), commented on (β = .208, η ρ 2 = .053, p = .006), and shared posts (r = .213, p = .007) even when having con-935 trolled for the presence of photos and prompts to share. This is in line with the contentions that the emotional dimension of rhetoric is an increasingly vital part of contemporary political communication and youth engagement with 940 the potential to initiate their involvement and influence their voting choice (Brader, 2005) . The campaign was also successful in engaging followers with messages focusing on Obama's ethos, that is, his credibility and sta-tus, because such messages received more likes (U = 1981, p < .001), comments (U = 2851.5, p < .001), and shares (U = 1964, p < .001) than non-ethos posts. The strategic emphasis on hope and enthusiasm, as opposed to the use of neg-950 ative or attack messages, was rewarded by followers: positive acclaims were more likely to be shared than other types of posts (η ρ 2 = .043, p = .016) even when controlling for prompts to share, which as mentioned below emerged as a 955 key factor.
The inclusion of logical reasoning (logos) did not increase the likelihood of a post receiving more likes. This is interesting as it may indicate the limits of reason in contemporary 960 political discourse (or it could simply mean that the Obama campaign was just not as good at framing logical arguments as they were at projecting emotions and credibility). However, citizens who followed the Obama campaign on 965 Facebook were willing to engage in a public dialogue on posts that utilized rational argumentation, because the use of logos had a statistically significant relationship with the number of shares (U = 1489, p = .001) and comments 970 (U = 1826, p = .045) and they still engaged substantively with policy content (see Table 9 ). This can actually be attributed to the presence of particular policy themes: education posts were by far the most popular, while statements on taxes 975 (η ρ 2 = .029, p = .045) and foreign policy (η ρ 2 = .027, p = .052) attracted significantly greater numbers of comments, having controlled for the presence of a photo. On the other hand, posts featuring action-980 oriented personal appeal (e.g., "If you're standing with the president, we've got a free sticker for you" or "Make sure your friends and family know the choice on taxes in this election") were less likely to be liked (U = 2515, p = .020). 985 Similarly, we found that posts about competitions (β = −.173, p = .017), promotional links (β = −.235, p = .029), and photos of celebrities (β = −.318, p = .045) received significantly less user interaction.
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DISCUSSION: THE POWER AND LIMITS OF POLITICAL PERSONALIZATION
Our analysis showed that the Obama campaign made highly strategic and focused use 995 of Facebook as a tool for promoting its key messages and, crucially, for mobilizing supporters to act on its behalf. The main focus of the posts was Obama's personality and family, while rhetorically, the campaign depended 1000 mostly on emotions (pathos) and to a lesser extent on credibility (ethos). Although policy statements did feature during the sampled period, they were obscured by a preoccupation with Obama's character and also by daily calls 1005 to action. These findings largely concur with recent studies (Bronstein, 2013; Katz, Barris & Jain, 2013; Lilleker & Jackson, 2011; Serazio, 2014) that challenge the widespread perception of the Obama campaign's digital presence 1010 as revolutionary and emphasize the continuing importance of campaign strategy.
A closer look at Obama's own style, as well as of the particular political context within which the 2012 campaign took place, 1015 offers an interesting explanation for the campaign's focus on personality rather than record. Foley (2013) argues that the gap between Obama's grand rhetorical vision and everyday policy pragmatism has produced a cer-1020 tain kind of presidential ambiguity that hampers his attempt to connect with the American people. Negotiating that gap-which involves defending, contextualizing, and explaining complex policies and decisions that the president 1025 may genuinely believe to be the right ones-is a process of translation that requires substantive engagement with people's realities and knowledge gaps. This process has been impeded not only by Obama's own style of decision mak-1030 ing, which tends to be introverted and reflective (Foley, 2013) , but also by the actions of other actors in the public sphere of the United States. Furthermore, the adverse economic circumstances of Obama's first term have meant 1035 that a core part of his record could only be framed as what Foley calls a "negative achievement," that is, the economy not getting worse. In this context, the capacity of new media such as Facebook to allow for potentially direct com-1040 munication between the president and the public could have provided him with a way of bypassing the "noise" produced by other political actors.
Despite the intensive use of personalization 1045 in a rhetorical attempt to close the gap between the candidate and his supporters, the discourse of the Obama campaign on Facebook was highly managed and close-ended: only one out of 163 posts asked followers to consider what 1050 could be classified as a substantive question. Therefore, although the campaign successfully used Facebook to extend and mobilize its fan base, the strategic discourse did not encourage the creation of loops of feedback, which are 1055 key to building a dialogic relationship (Kent & Taylor, 1998) . By focusing on Obama's family and personality, the campaign essentially controlled the discussion, because neither of these topics is particularly conducive to substan-1060 tive and in-depth political engagement on the part of the citizens. Although policy discourse could be equally close-ended, readers may hold strong opinions and be prepared to articulate them, challenging the official message. (Cogburn & Espinoza-Vasquez, 2011) . Although Facebook posts on the campaign's official page may not be the ideal vehicle for microtargeted messages, the increasing sophistication, scope, and reach 1100 of Facebook's personalization algorithm (see Gerodimos & Gray, 2013 )-along with a strategic shift toward the integration of ads into the News Feed may soon allow that kind of campaigning to take place through Facebook, 1105 too.
Directing Facebook followers to spread the campaign's message may signify an important change in terms of where and how political campaigning takes place, but it does not nec-1110 essarily constitute a paradigm shift in terms of truly interactive communication between politicians and citizens. Having said that, even closeended and strategic rhetoric, almost by definition, entails the agency of citizens, its success 1115 depending on the extent to which it can capture the moment and articulate issues, conflicts, or sociopolitical cleavages that are salient among the people (kairos and stasis, respectively; see Martin, 2013) . In other words, political broad-1120 casting requires an acute understanding of how citizens feel and what they need; listening is a prerequisite of successful strategic rhetoric. Furthermore, the act and process of engaging with a campaign may well have multiple benefits for a citizen's civic skills (such as political sophistication), social capital, and overall participation. In fact, Bode (2012) argues that, through interaction, conversation, and possible preference alteration, Facebook use may not just 1130 lead to civic skills but may also influence users. In that respect, future research should try to look at the effects and benefits of civic interaction on social media beyond the instances of communication itself.
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At this point, the limitations of the study should be acknowledged. Although our analysis captured every message posted in the two months before the 2012 election, this sample is still a partial snapshot in the context of a massive 1140 and multimedia campaign that had started several months before Election Day. Furthermore, due to the study's angle, we did not log or analyze the content of comments posted by followers on the campaign's various posts. Although 1145 such an undertaking would have certainly produced valuable insights regarding the quality, nature, and depth of civic deliberation among Obama's followers, it fell outside of this particular analysis's remit. The number of interactions 1150 each post received is a metric that can only provide tentative and indicative findings of what content people are more likely to engage with on Facebook. A broad range of elements will influence that process of engagement: users' personal 1155 attitude to politics and social media use, their habits in using social media (some never like, others always like), the temporal and geographical context around a particular message, the cultural and social context around the sent mes-1160 sage, and the individual's situational context (mood, in a rush, personal bias). It is impossible to measure all of these on a large scale. However, significant associations were established, revealing-or rather, suggesting-a gen-1165 eral tendency or inclination to engage more with particular themes or types of rhetoric. Although users exposed to published messages are in the first instance those who have liked (effectively subscribed to) Obama's official Facebook page, 1170 hence implying a Democrat inclination in a majority of the target audience, when an individual likes or shares a post, this becomes visible to their networks, exposing other Facebook users to the published messages as well. 1175 Finally, as our intention was to look at merely what was "on the page" and how users engaged with that material at the basic level of using Facebook's features, we cannot make conclusive claims about the intentions of the campaign's 1180 communication strategists or, indeed, about any long-term effects on the followers or the externalities of the messages communicated through that page. Still, our analysis produced a rich body of data that provides us with important 1185 insights regarding both the 2012 Obama campaign itself and, more broadly, about emerging patterns of online political communication and engagement.
Further qualitative research is needed into 1190 the motivations, meanings, and significance of a Facebook interaction (like/comment/share) to the platform's users. For example, does a "like" only express positive sentiments? How much affinity or endorsement is usually a prerequi-1195 site to liking content (merely superficial and impulsive response or significant and meaningful agreement)? And how does an individual decide what to share and what not to?
Thinking more broadly in terms of the rela-1200 tionship between new media and political communication, our analysis of the 2012 Obama Facebook campaign revealed elements of both normalization (focus on candidate, underutilization of the medium's potential) and innova-1205 tion (more positive tone, space for debate even if the discourse is close-ended). Despite noting that the claims of postmodern campaigning are overstated, Larsson (2013) argues that the potential for structural change rests with 1210 politicians and with citizens, because both sides have the resources to enforce change. As shown earlier, the Obama campaign's followers were quite selective in what types of messages they interacted with, largely overlooking promotional 1215 posts such as calls to action and celebrity endorsements, and engaging with character and family messages as well as policy statements, which would seem to go against fears of "dumbing down."
1220
The question then arises: is the highly sophisticated, digitized, and personalized permanent campaign inherently at odds with a mode of substantive citizen-politician communication and even coproduction of political ideas? Will it ever be possible-and is it even desirable-to combine the efficiency, highly strategic messages, centralized operations, and war-like mentality of political campaigning with substantive forms of civic interaction? Such civic input, if 1230 not necessarily shaping policy, could at least enhance both politicians' understanding of the reality on the ground and citizens' understanding of the complexities and constraints of contemporary policy making in a highly globalized, 1235 decentralized, and interdependent world. Such dialogue might have significant benefits for both sides, boosting empathy and systemic trust, even if politicians were to stand their ground (which might actually enhance their popular standing). 
NOTE
1. Because the recording of posts only started on October 10, 2012, the samples were initially divided into two groups; post interactions from before October 10 (39 days) were recorded after the post had been published 1255 for a while. For example, a post from September 10 had a month of exposure when recorded while a post from October 1 merely had 10 days of exposure, potentially compromising the comparability of the number of interactions, because these accumulate over an indefinite period of 1260 time. Samples recorded after October 10 were consistently recorded every day. To counter this potential limitation, a preliminary analysis was carried out to establish if these two groups of posts could be compared. The number of interactions in every post gathered after October 10 was 1265 recorded repeatedly in the first five days after a post was published to establish whether there was a saturation threshold after which interaction with the post diminished. The purpose of this was to ensure that the number of interactions in posts recorded more than five days after 1270 they were published could be compared to other posts. Our preliminary analysis showed that the number of new interactions receded considerably after the third day and almost ceded five days after a post was originally published, indicating that older posts coded after several days 1275 of exposure and newer posts coded consistently after five days constituted a homogeneous and workable sample.
